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present appeal, that the Board of Pardons lacked authority to toll his Utah sentence while
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it was raised for the first time on appeal. 2003 UT App 213 at *1 and *1 n.l.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JEFF TUCKER,
Petitioner/Appellant,
Case No. 20080748-CA

v.
STATE OF UTAH etal.,
Respondents/Appellees.

Appeal from an Order of the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable Robert K. Hilder, Presiding

BRIEF OF APPELLEES

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is taken from a final order entered by the Third Judicial District Court
on August 21, 2008, R. 304-11 (Add. A), dismissing with prejudice petitioner's Amended
Petition for Extraordinary Relief, brought under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B. R. 2-6. Petitioner,
a sex offender confined to the Utah State Prison, alleged that respondents were
wrongfully restraining him in violation of his rights under the federal and state
constitutions and state statutes. Following entry of the court's order of dismissal,
petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal on August 27, 2008. R. 315-17. Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(f) (West Supp. 2008) gives this Court jurisdiction over the appeal
from the district court's order on the petition for extraordinary writ.

ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL
1.

Because petitioner challenged the actions of the Board of Pardons, the district

court correctly considered the petition under Utah R. Civ. P. 654B(d)(2)(D).
2.

The district court correctly ruled that, as a matter of law, the undisputed facts

failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
3.

The district court correctly concluded that the tolling of petitioner's sentence

during his incarceration on federal charges did not violate the prohibition against ex post
facto laws or other constitutional provisions.
4*

The district court correctly ruled that the Board of Pardons1 issuance of a retaking

warrant did not exceed its constitutional authority and that the signed warrant request was
appropriately certified under Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-11(3) (West 2004).
S«

The order prepared by respondents' attorney and issued by the district court judge

correctly stated the district court's rulings.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules pertinent to the
issues before the Court is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
The petition in this case was filed on October 16, 2007. R. 2-6 (petition), 7-29

(supporting memorandum). In a Memorandum Decision and Order entered October 22,
2007, the district court judge dismissed the petition without prejudice. R. 39-40.
2

Following three motions to extend time, R. 46-49, 63-65, and 74-76, petitioner filed an
amended petition, R. 83-113, alleging that the Board of Pardons (Board) had violated his
constitutional rights by (1) extending his sentence through tolling during the time he was
paroled to federal custody, (2) seizing him on his release from parole to federal custody,
(3) issuing a retaking warrant on the basis of an uncertified warrant request, and (4)
incarcerating him beyond the time calculated from the Utah Sentencing Guidelines
matrix. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, R. 217-18, supported by a memorandum,
R. 140-216. The district court granted the motion from the bench on July 30, 2008, and
ordered counsel for respondents to prepare an order. R. 297. Over petitioner's objections,
R. 300-03, the judge signed respondents1 proposed order on August 21, 2008, R. 304-10,
noting and overruling the objections. R. 310. Five days later, petitioner filed a timely
notice of appeal. R. 315-16.
It,

Statement of Relevant Facts
On or about May 18, 1990, petitioner entered a plea of guilty to sexual abuse of a

child, a second degree felony, and was sentenced to a term of not less than one year nor
more than fifteen years. R. 141, 155, 305. He was paroled effective March 28, 1995,
R. 141,157, 305, but was returned to prison as the result of a Board warrant dated
December 4, 1995. R. 141, 161,305. He was paroled a second time on May 14,1996,
R. 141,163, 305, and was again returned to prison on a Board warrant dated June 12,
1998. R. 141,167,305. On July 27,2001, a federal detainer was lodged against

3

petitioner. R. 141, 305.l Petitioner was paroled to federal authorities for disposition of
the detainer effective April 2,2002. R. 141,171,305. In reporting the results of the
Special Attention Review establishing this parole date, the Board explicitly noted that
,f

[t]ime on Utah's sentence will toll while Mr. Tucker is in Federal custody." R. 171; see

also R. 141, 305. On July 20, 2001, judgment was entered against petitioner on a federal
criminal charge of possession of child pornography, and he was sentenced to five years of
confinement followed by three years of supervised release. R. 141,173, 305.
Petitioner was returned to state custody on August 9, 2006, and was placed in the
Bonneville Community Correctional Center (BCCC) for completion of a sex offender
program. R. 142, 180, 305. On September 12,2006, he admitted to BCCC staff that he
had accessed child pornography while in federal custody and had brought cartoon-like
"anime" images of young girls in the nude to BCCC. R. 142, 187, 306. Investigators
conducted a search of his former room at the federal halfway house and discovered three
computer disks containing pornographic cartoon images and photographs of female
children in provocative poses. R. 142, 180, 186, 306. Based on the disks and on
petitioner's failure to complete the sex offender program, the Board issued a retaking
warrant on September 15, 2008. R. 142, 190, 306„ Petitioner initially pled not guilty to
violating his parole agreement, but, in a subsequent letter to the Board, withdrew his

*By clerical error, Exhibit #6 (R. 169) to respondents1 memorandum supporting the
motion to dismiss is a 1998 federal detainer. Plaintiff has not disputed the fact of his parole to
federal authorities under the 2001 detainer.

4

denial of and accepted responsibility for the charged violations; he also waived his right
to an evidentiary hearing before the Board. R. 142,192, 306.
Petitioner's sentence will expire on May 29, 2009. Hrg. DVD at 9:24:13-23.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The petition in this case challenges the actions of the Board of Pardons as
exceeding the Board's jurisdiction or conflicting with constitutional and statutory law.
Such claims are expressly governed by Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(2)(D). Petitioner admits
that his petition is based on an alleged misapplication of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202-a
provision that explicitly addresses the discretion of the Board of Pardons.2 See Aplt.
Brief at 7a. He provides no authority to support his contention that his case should be
decided under subsection (b) of the rule, as a wrongful restraint on personal liberty. His
preference for the remedies provided in subsection (b) is an insufficient basis on which to
recharacterize his claims. Moreover, his four-sentence argument on this point, lacking
any citation to relevant case law, is inadequate briefing of the issue under Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(9).
In ruling on the amended petition, the district court applied the correct test for a
motion to dismiss under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6): whether, accepting the facts alleged,

2

This Court decided the same claim against petitioner in a prior case, Tucker v.
State, 2003 UT App 213,2003 WL 21469154. Petitioner did not argue ex post facto
application of the relevant statute until that case was on appeal, and the Court declined to
consider the issue as untimely raised. Because he could and should have raised the issue
for timely consideration in the prior case, claim preclusion can be applied to bar its
consideration here, as respondents argued in the district court. See R. 142-44.
5

petitioner has a right to relief based on those facts. Petitioner has identified no fact that
the district court failed to accept as alleged. Instead, he argues that the court improperly
entertained questions of law in considering the petition. See Aplt. Brief at 8. But
precedent makes clear that the court need not accept petitioner's view of the law in
making that assessment.
Applying the law to the facts as alleged, the district court correctly concluded that
the tolling of petitioner's sentence during his confinement on federal charges did not
violate his constitutional rights and was within the Board's authority. Rather than
showing error in the district court's analysis, petitioner simply repeats the arguments the
court rejected. He presents no authority contradicting the court's conclusions that (1) the
Board was within its authority to toll the sentence, and (2) the tolling did not increase
petitioner's punishment in violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
Petitioner's representation that the district court did not conclude, in the July 30,
2008 hearing, that the signatures on the warrant request met the statutory certification
requirement (see Aplt. Brief at 2-3) is belied by the recording of the hearing that
petitioner moved this Court to admit as a part of the record on appeal. Moreover, as
petitioner concedes, he pleaded "no contest" to the Board's revocation allegations. Aplt.
Brief at 6. By doing so, he waived any nonjurisdictional irregularities in the revocation
process, as the district court judge agreed. See Hrg. DVD at 9:21:54 - 9:22:08.
Finally, the district court did not err in signing the order prepared at the -court's
request by counsel for the Board. The court ordered counsel to prepare an order setting
6

forth the court's ruling. See Hrg. DVD at 9:25:29-36; R. 297. Once the order was
submitted to the court, petitioner filed his objections to it. R. 300-03. As signed by the
court on August 21, 2008, the order notes and overrules petitioner's objections, R. 310,
and clarifies that the facts provided in the order are not findings, but the factual history of
the case. R. 305. Petitioner has cited no authority for his contention that the practice of
ordering the prevailing party to prepare an order reflecting the court's ruling is in any way
improper.
Because petitioner has failed to demonstrate error in the district court's order, there
are no grounds to disturb it.
ARGUMENT
Standard of Review: A motion to dismiss "presents a question of law that we
review for correctness. Moreover, the district court's inteipretation of prior precedent,
statutes, and the common law are questions of law that we review for correctness." Ellis
v. Estate of Ellis, 2007 UT 77, H 6, 169 P.3d 441.
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONSIDERED THE
PETITION UNDER RULE 65B(d)(2)(D) OF THE UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Petitioner asserts that the district court erroneously failed to consider his petition
under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b). Subsection (b) of the rule governs wrongful restraints on
personal liberty. After reviewing the amended petition, the district court ruled that,
because the petition alleged improprieties by the Board of Pardons, it would consider the
petition under subsection (d)(2)(D) of the rule, which explicitly governs claims that "the
7

Board of Pardons and Parole has exceeded it jurisdiction or failed to perform an act
required by constitutional or statutory law." In so ruling, the court observed that the
application of subsection (d)(2)(D) was warranted because "the gravamen of Mr. Tucker's
petition seems to be that the Board of Pardons denied him due process by exceeding its
powers under the Constitution and by illegally extending his sentence beyond the stated
expiration date." R. 126.
Petitioner's argument on this point, contained in its entirety on the unnumbered
page between pages 7 and 8 of his brief, demonstrates the correctness of the district
court's decision. Petitioner asserts that the Board's application of Utah Code Aim.
§ 76-3-202(8) illegally lengthened his sentence, making his arrest on a Board warrant
during the allegedly illegal extension a wrongful restraint on his personal liberty. Absent
the Board's allegedly illegal actions, petitioner would not have a claim. Because, as the
court correctly determined, petitioner's claims are based on actions of the Board that
allegedly violated its constitutional and statutory powers, consideration of the petition
under subsection (d)(2)(D) was not only proper, but required by precedent. In a similar
case, an inmate sought post-conviction relief under two subsections of Utah R. Civ. P.
65B as well as Rule 65C. This Court observed that despite the petitioner's argument that
the district court had applied the wrong provision, "the district court appropriately
analyzed the petition for its substance, rather than its caption." Glasscock v. State, 2005
UT App 12,2005 WL 67583 at *1 n.2. See also Renn v. Utah State Board of Pardons,
904 P.2d 677, 683 (Utah 1995) ("Petitions for writs of habeas corpus under [former] Rule

8

65B(c)[governing "[ojther wrongful restraints on personal liberty"] cannot be used to
challenge Board actions that might be challenged under [former] Rule 65B(e) [now Rule
65B(d)(2)(D)].);" Padilla v. Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, 947 P.2d 664, 667 (Utah
1997) (quoting Renn); Manning v. State, 2004 UT App 87, f 20 n.5, 89 P.3d 196 (citing
Padilla).
Because petitioner has failed to show that the district court's application of
subsection (d)(2)(D) was erroneous, there is no reason to disturb its ruling on this issue.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT APPLIED THE CORRECT LEGAL
STANDARD IN RULING THAT THE PETITION FAILED TO STATE A
CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED
Petitioner argues that the district court erred by failing to conclude that the petition
alleged sufficient facts to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim. However, many of
the "facts" he asserts the court disregarded are not facts at all, but petitioner's legal
conclusions. On appeal, "a court need not accept conclusory allegations made in the
complaint as true," including conclusions of law. Cline v. Brown, 2008 UT App 319, f 2,
2008 WL 3975624.
As "facts" that the district court declined to accept, petitioner lists issues of law:
that the Utah Constitution places limitations on the Board's powers; that the legislature
unconstitutionally gave the Board powers properly belonging to Article VIII courts, in
violation of Article Vfs separation of powers; and that applying the Board's legislatively
derived powers to petitioner violated petitioner's due process rights because the powers

9

themselves are unconstitutional. See Aplt. Brief at 3.3 To the extent that he makes any
challenge to the factual history contained in the district court's order elsewhere in his
brief, he does not show how any challenged fact contradicts the facts as alleged in his
petition or affects the court's analysis. Instead, he seeks only to provide an explanatory
context for certain facts to fit his legal theory that the Board acted in violation of his
rights. See Aplt. Brief at 19-22.
Forcing the district court to accept petitioner's conclusions of law would deprive it
of its rightful role in assessing the sufficiency of the petition. The court must "first
examine the applicable law" to determine whether the facts alleged meet the elements of a
claim under the provisions of law invoked. Wliipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910
P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996). As petitioner acknowledges, "he js just a layman at law"
who "has not had the benefit of years of training and practice" in legal tasks. Aplt. Brief
at 16. As such, he is not in the court's advantaged position to interpret the law.
Consequently, leaving interpretation of the law to the court in the context of a motion to
dismiss satisfies both common sense and precedent. Moreover, petitioner has provided
no authority for his proposition that, in a motion to dismiss, the court must accept his
interpretation of the law. The lack of support for his position gives no ground for
reversal.

Petitioner's more specific contentions (e.g., that the Board improperly applied
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202(8)) fall into these general categories.

1#

An examination of the historic facts petitioner purports to challenge shows that the
district court did not fail to consider them as alleged in the petition. In addressing the
fact numbered 6 in the district court's decision, R. 305, petitioner correctly points out that
the federal detainer at R. 169 is dated September 15,1998, not July 27, 2001. However,
as explained above in n.l, the 1998 detainer was attached by mistake to the memorandum
supporting respondents' motion to dismiss instead of the 2001 detainer. Despite this
error, petitioner affirmatively represented in the memorandum supporting his petition that
"[ejarly 2001, petitioner's federal trial was held, & he was sentenced on July 21, 2001 [,]"
and that on August 7, 2001, the Board granted him a parole to federal custody, effective
April 2, 2002, for service of his federal sentence. R. 8-9, f 7.4 From these admissions,
the court could reasonably infer that a federal detainer had issued, and petitioner does not
deny that it did. Moreover, at no point has petitioner maintained that the Board
improperly turned him over to federal authorities for service of his federal sentence.
Because the clerical error is inconsequential and does not affect the substance of
petitioner's claims, it cannot serve as the basis for reversal of the district court's decision.
Petitioner next argues that the facts numbered 7, 8, and 9 in the district court's
decision establish a false chronology. There is no substance to this claim. In his petition,

4

Although the district court dismissed the original petition without prejudice by order of
October 22,2007, R. 39, petitioner moved the court to attach the memorandum submitted with
the original petition, R. 7-32, to the amended petition. R. 77-79. When a response was ordered,
the memorandum was forwarded to respondents with the amended petition and is, therefore, a
part of the amended petition.
II

petitioner affirmatively represented that he was paroled to federal authorities "as a
'release' to federal detainer" effective April 2,2002, as stated in fact no. 7. R. 9, f 8; 305,
% 7. Likewise, the petition states that when the Board granted the April 2, 2002, parole
date, it "announced its intent to 'toll' petitioner's time while in federal custodyf,]" just as
fact no. 8 states. R. 9, f 7; 305, f 8. As to fact no. 9, which states that "Petitioner was
federally tried and convicted of Possession of Child Pornography[,]" R. 305, €|J 9,
petitioner admits as much in his brief. Aplt. Brief at 4, f 2. He also refers to the federal
court judgment imposing the federal sentence "signed by Judge Campbell 7/19/2001[,]"
Aplt. Brief at 19, which shows a 60-month term of incarceration followed by 36 months
of supervised release, as fact no. 9 reflects. R. 173,305 % 9.
Petitioner's attack on the facts numbered 11 and 12 is equally unavailing.
Although he contends that, contrary to fact no. 11, he did not admit to accessing child
pornography while detained at the federal halfway house, he affirmatively states in the
memorandum supporting his petition that the halfway house staff found three computer
disks, one that included his resume, "containing 9 photographs of female children wearing
swimsuits, and 29 'cartoon' images of children of a pornographic nature[,]ff consistent
with facts no. 11 and 12. R. 10, f 11. In his brief, he also acknowledges talking to the
Bonneville Community Correctional Center's treatment team about accessing child
pornography. Aplt. Brief at 21. Whether the disks were found before or after he spoke
with the treatment team is irrelevant to the issues on appeal and has no bearing on the
correctness of the district court's rulings.

12

In short, the district court applied the correct analysis to petitioner's claims. It
accepted the facts as pleaded, independently analyzed the applicable law, and determined
that the facts failed to state a claim for relief under the law. Because petitioner has failed
to show that the court's rulings were dependent on any fact contradicted by the petition,
he is not entitled to relief on this issue.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT TOLLING
PETITIONER'S STATE SENTENCE DURING HIS FEDERAL
INCARCERATION WAS BOTH CONSTITUTIONAL AND WITHIN
THE BOARD'S AUTHORITY
Petitioner maintains that the Board lacked authority to toll his Utah sentence
during service of the sentence on his federal conviction. He bases his claim on the fact
that Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202(8) (West Supp. 2008), which prohibits crediting an
offender for time spent in confinement outside the state, was enacted after his conviction
in 1998, and argues that it cannot be applied retroactively. Petitioner's argument is
without merit.
This Court has previously considered whether the Board has the authority to toll a
Utah sentence during an offender's incarceration by another jurisdiction. In Ontiveros v.
Utah Board of Pardons, 897 P.2d 1222 (Utah App. 1995), an offender sentenced in 1979
to an indeterminate term of not less than one nor more than fifteen years was paroled in
1987. While on parole, he was arrested for robbery in California and sentenced to four
years of incarceration. Based on the California offense, the Board found him in violation
of his parole and required him to serve the balance of his Utah sentence, without credit

13

for time served on the California conviction. The Court concluded that "Appellant's
imprisonment in California on a different conviction effectively suspended the time for
the running of his sentence in Utah. Appellant is not entitled to credit for time served in
California on a new and different conviction." Ontiveros, 897 P.2d at 1224.
Petitioner's attempt to distinguish Ontiveros is unavailing. First, he asserts that the
Ontiveros decision is inapplicable because it postdates his conviction by five years. He
fails to recognize that it applied to a 1979 conviction that, like petitioner's, predated the
addition of subsection (8) to the statute. The decision was based on the Board's
"extremely broad amount of discretion 'to determine the period of time that will actually
be served.'" Ontiveros, 897 P.2d at 1223 (quoting Rawlings v. Holden, 869 P.2d 958, 961
(Utah App. 1994) (quoting State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 277 (Utah 1985))). Thus,
the Court recognized the Board's authority to toll an offender's sentence during service of
a sentence in another jurisdiction even before that authority was codified in statute.
Second, petitioner observes that he was already incarcerated on a parole violation when
he was released to federal authorities, while Ontiveros was not incarcerated, but on parole
when he was released pursuant to an interstate compact. He does not explain why this
fact should produce a different outcome. The relevant fact is that petitioner, like
Ontiveros, was fulfilling a state criminal sentence at the time he was turned over to
another jurisdiction for service of a sentence imposed by that jurisdiction. It is the
confinement by a different jurisdiction and on a different crime that "effectively

14

suspended the time for the running o f the Utah sentence. Id. at 1224. Ontiveros controls
here.
This Court has previously held that petitioner himself is not entitled to credit
toward his Utah sentence for the time served on his federal crime-and that section
76-3-202(8) applies to him. In Tucker v. State, 2003 UT App 213, 2003 WL 21469154
("Tucker T), the Court held that "Petitioner's argument-that time spent incarcerated on
his federal convictions should simultaneously count towards service of his Utah
sentence-is entirely without merit." 2003 UT App 213 at *1. The Court also noted that,
"[cjontrary to Petitioner's assertions, the language of section 76-3-202(8) does not require
that Petitioner be 'convicted while on parole' [like Ontiveros] for the provision to apply."
Id. Although the district court did not rely on this Court's prior decision, it constitutes res
judicata as to the applicability of the statute, as respondents argued below. See R. 142-44.
Res judicata comprises two branches, claim preclusion and issue preclusion.
Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 74, f 22, 34 P.3d 180 (quotingMaoris &
Assocs. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93,1f 19, 16 P.3d 1214). The former "involves the same
parties and their privies and also the same cause of action, 'and thus precludes the
relitigation of all issues that could have been raised as well as those that were, in fact,
litigated in the prior action.'" Id. (quoting Maoris, 2000 UT 93 at f 19). Issue preclusion
"'arises from a different cause of action and prevents parties or their privies from
relitigating facts and issues in the second suit that were fully litigated in the first suit.'"
Id. (quoting Maoris, 2000 UT 93 at ^f 19). As pointed out in the memorandum supporting
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respondents' motion to dismiss, both branches are implicated in the present case. Tucker I
involved the identical parties as in the present case: petitioner and the State. The claims
regarding the Board's authority under the statute are identical to those made in Tucker I,
which was decided in afinaljudgment on the merits after being fully and fairly litigated.
And petitioner could and should have raised his ex post facto argument in Tucker I, but
failed to do so. As the Court noted in declining to reach that issue, petitioner's challenge
to ex post facto application of the statute "w[as] not raised in his petition below, and
Petitioner has not argued plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. Therefore,
we do not address these arguments." 2003 UT App 213 at *1 n.l.
Even though the district court chose not to grant respondents' motion to dismiss on
res judicata grounds, "[i[t is well established that an appellate court may affirm a
judgment, order, or decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or
theory apparent on the record,' even though that ground or theory was not identified by
the lower court as the basis of its ruling." Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah
1998) (quoting Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, 23 Utah 2d 222, 225 n.2,461
P.2d 290,293 n.2 (1969)). Because Tucker I established that (1) the Board acted within
its power in applying section 76-3-202(8) to petitioner, and (2) petitioner could and
should have raised his ex post facto argument in that case, claim and issue preclusion bar
him from raising those issues again. The Court may affirm the district court's judgment
on these record-supported, alternative grounds.
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As the district court judge took great pains to explain to petitioner, petitioner had
not completed his Utah sentence when he was paroled to federal custody. See Hrg. DVD
at 9:16:06 - 9:19:56, 9:23:33 - 9:25:28. While the tolling of his Utah sentence during
federal custody did delay petitionees ultimate release date as estimated at the time of
sentencing, it did not increase the total length of time served over the fifteen-year
maximum ordered by the sentencing court. Under Ontiveros, as subsequently codified in
statute, his Utah sentence was suspended by virtue of his confinement in another
jurisdiction. Because he still Mowe[d] a debt of service time" in Utah once his federal
sentence was completed, R. 307, the district court correctly dismissed this claim, and
petitioner has failed to show error in that decision.
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT A SIGNED
WARRANT REQUEST WAS APPROPRIATELY CERTIFIED UNDER
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-11(3)
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-11 governs revocation of parole. Under the statute,
(3) Any member of the board may issue a warrant based upon a certified
warrant request to a peace officer or other persons authorized to arrest,
detain, and return to actual custody a parolee, and may upon arrest or
otherwise direct the Department of Corrections to determine if there is
probable cause to believe that the parolee has violated the conditions of his
parole.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-11(3) (West 2004). The word "certified" is defined neither in
the statute nor in section 77-27-1, which contains the definitions applicable to Chapter 27
of Title 77. The warrant request in this case was signed by both the agent and his
supervisor. R. 184.
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Petitioner's argument on this point attacks the validity of two documents: first, the
signed request submitted to the Board for a retaking warrant, and second, the district
court's signed order granting respondents' motion to dismiss. Contrary to petitioner's
contentions, both documents are validated by the signatures they contain. In addition,
petitioner's ultimate acceptance of the Board charges, waiver of personal appearance, and
withdrawal of his request for an evidentiary hearing on the charges acted as a v/aiver of
all nonjurisdictional defects, including any irregularity in the warrant request. See R. 192;
see also Alvillar v. Board of Pardons, 2005 UT App 356,2005 WL 2373919 at *2; Bacon
v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 25, 2006 WL 181523 at *1.
In the July 30, 2008 hearing on respondents' motion to dismiss, the district court
agreed with respondents' counsel that the signatures of the agent and supervisor on the
warrant request submitted to the Board fulfilled the certification requirement contained in
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-11(3) (West 2004). Petitioner argues that the court's conclusion
to this effect in its order is "a product wholly of the attorney general's imagination and did
not issue from the court." Aplt. Brief at 3, The order was signed by the judge and
contains his handwritten, initialed modifications. In light of these facts, petitioner's
representation is not merely unconvincing, but unsupportable. Moreover, it is
contradicted by the DVD of the hearing that petitioner successfully moved to have this
Court incorporate as a part of the record.
The judge had an extensive exchange with petitioner on the issue of the
certification requirement after petitioner presented his argument on the point. See Hrg.
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DVD at 9:08:56 - 9:15:00. In the course of that discussion, the judge referred to
respondents1 argument that the signatures rendered the warrant request compliant with
statute, indicating his agreement with it, See Hrg. DVD at 9:11:36 - 9:12:00. Because the
term "certified" is undefined in statute, the judge declined to impose a technical meaning
on it, instead construing it in harmony with its ordinary meaning of something given with
written assurance. He concluded that, as respondents argued, the signatures of the agent
and supervisor did act as a certification under the statutory language, and that no
additional formalities, such as notarization, were necessary.
Petitioner attempts to invoke a Fourth Amendment standard of requiring an oath or
affirmation with regard to warrant requests. He claims that under Jones v. Utah Board of
Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53, 94 P.3d 283, an oath or affirmation is essential to the
validity of the warrant request, and its absence renders the revocation process
unconstitutionally defective. Petitioner misreads Jones. In Jones, the Utah Supreme
Court considered "whether section 77-27-11(3) violates the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, both of
which prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures, because it allows for a retaking arrest
without probable cause." 2004 UT 53 at f 8. The court held that it did not, stating that
demanding a finding of probable cause before a retaking "would impose requirements on
section 77-27-11(3) that are not required by either the United States Constitution or the
Utah Constitution." Id. at f 43. As the court observed, "It is well established that a
parolee has a more limited right to due process than other citizens," id. at f 45, it
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concluded that where the Board "may ask the Department of Corrections to determine if
there is probable cause to detain a parolee, and probable cause must be found in order to
further detain the parolee, the 'minimal inquiry1 requirements of due process of both the
Utah and the United States Constitutions are met." Id. at \ 46.
Even if petitioner were entitled to a warrant request certified by something more
than the signatures of the agent and supervisor, the district court correctly ruled that the
claim was waived. In a handwritten letter dated November 16, 2006, petitioner stated::
Because I was incorrectly informed as to policy, I mistakenly
requested on Nov.l an evidentiary hearing before the Board of Pardons.
Please withdraw that request, and consider this notice as a waiver of
personal appearance and withdrawal of my denial of violation allegations.
As stated, I accept the charge of violation, waive personal appearance for
revocation, and await your decision.
I am sincerely sorry for any inconvenience this may have caused.
Thank you.
R. 192. In a similar case, this Court denied extraordinary relief to a parolee who
challenged procedural aspects of his revocation but entered an unconditional no contest
plea to the underlying parole violations. The Court held that "[b]y pleading no contest to
each violation, [the parolee] waived any claim that he was denied procedural due process
in the parole revocation proceedings." Alvillar, 2005 UT App 356 at *2; see also Bacon,
2006 UT App 25 at *1 ("Thus, by pleading guilty to the parole violations, {the parolee]
waived all nonjurisdictional defects that arose prior to his plea."). The district court judge
agreed that the claim had been waived both in the hearing and in the subsequent order.
Hrg. DVD at 9:21:54 - 9:22:07; R. 308. Petitioner has not addressed this conclusion in
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his brief, but it forms an additional ground for affirmance of the district court's decision as
to certification of the warrant request.
V. THE ORDER PREPARED BY RESPONDENTS1 COUNSEL AND
ISSUED BY THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE CORRECTLY STATED
THE DISTRICT COURTS RULINGS
Petitioner argues that the drafting of the district court's order by respondents'
counsel "defies every judicial principle of'due process1" and "creates a gross violation of
Tucker's due process rights over and above those complained of in his petition." Aplt.
Brief at 9. Nowhere in his brief does petitioner cite any authority for this novel
proposition. Moreover, it flies in the face of Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, which explicitly requires a prevailing party to prepare a proposed order unless
directed otherwise by the court.
Rule 7(f)(2) states:
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with
an initial memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the
prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve
upon the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's
decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within five days
after service. The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order
upon being served with an objection or upon expiration of the time to
object.
An examination of the record shows respondents' full compliance with Rule 7. Eight
days after the July 30, 2008 hearing, respondents' attorney served a proposed order on
petitioner. R. 311, mailing certificate. In turn, petitioner filed his objections to the order
on August 14, 2008. R. 300-03. On August 21, 2008, the district court judge made an
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initialed modification to the order, recaptioning the "Findings of Fact" as "Factual
History.M R. 305. He then signed the order as modified, adding under his signature,
"Objections noted and overruled." R. 310. Had the order not complied with the judge's
rulings, he had both the opportunity and the obligation to reject or modify it. His
signature of the modified order adopts it as the order of the court in all respects. As to
petitioner's contention that the court did not order dismissal with prejudice, Aplt. Brief at
2, petitioner raised that issue in his objections, R. 302, which were considered and
rejected by the court. R. 310. Nothing in petitioner's argument on this issue demonstrates
any deviation from the obligations of Rule 7, and the drafting of the order by respondents'
counsel consequently provides no basis for relief from the order as signed.
CONCLUSION
The substance of petitioner's claim-that the Board of Pardons exceeded its
authority in tolling petitioner's sentence while he was in federal custody-has previously
been decided against him by this Court. Although the Court declined to consider the ex
post facto argument as belatedly raised for the first time on appeal, petitioner could and
should have raised it at the district court level in that action, and it is barred in the present
case by res judicata. But even if the Court now chooses to review the claim on the merits,
petitioner has identified no error in the district court's rulings. Applying the appropriate
subsection of Utah R. Civ. P. 65B, the district court correctly concluded that the Board's
actions complied with relevant constitutional and statutory provisions, as reflected in its
order. Accepting the facts as alleged in the amended petition, the court applied the proper
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standard to determine that those facts failed fn :;(nfi" .i i (.11111 11111111 "»"",. (111. 11, 11• 11vI i ,,in I!i*•
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